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Appendix: Estimating the covariance matrixAbstract
We investigate the determinants of bilateral international equity and bond port-
folio reallocation across a large cross section of countries over the 1997 to 2001
period. We ￿rst argue that ￿nancial integration is not a global phenomenon, as
equity and bond home biases declined signi￿cantly only among European coun-
tries, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Then, we show that the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) eased the access to the equity market
and, to a larger extent, the bond market; thereby, enhancing regional ￿nancial
integration in the euro area. Beside the e⁄ect of the EMU, the strongest deter-
minants of the changes in portfolio weights are expected diversi￿cation bene￿ts
and the initial degree of underweight.
Keywords: Home bias - Risk diversi￿cation - International portfolio weights -
EMU
JEL classi￿cation: C13, C21, F37, G11.
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May 2006Non-technical summary
Financial systems in general serve not only to channel funds from those who have
a surplus to those who have a shortage of savings, but they also serve to trade,
hedge, diversify and pool risk. These functions help us to understand the economic
bene￿ts that can be derived from ￿nancial integration. There are two widely accepted
economic bene￿ts of ￿nancial integration: ￿rst, the better sharing and diversi￿cation
of risk; and second, the increase of the potential for higher economic growth.
One of the important arguments in favour of the existence of the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) is that via a higher degree of ￿nancial integra-
tion it enhances potential output and risk sharing among its participating member
states. By showing price convergence across a number of ￿nancial instruments, the
ECB (2005) publication ￿Indicators of ￿nancial integration in the euro area￿￿nds
evidence that a signi￿cant degree of ￿nancial integration has indeed taken place. Al-
though asset price convergence constitutes an important element of evaluating the
degree of ￿nancial integration, it portrays only one facet of this process. Investigat-
ing whether capital has been reallocated across countries worldwide, and the extent of
such reallocation associated with the introduction of the euro, could provide another
important element of better gauging how EMU might have promoted the integration
of ￿nancial markets both in the euro area as well as globally.
By using mainly a IMF global portfolio holdings database covering the 30
largest economies over the 1997 to 2001 period - during which cross-border capital
￿ ows rose sharply - (i) we review whether the reallocation of capital among countries
is due to a general decline in home bias world-wide and/or to the establishment of
EMU; (ii) we assess whether the EMU has enhanced ￿nancial integration among euro
area member states; (iii) we investigate the determinants of portfolio reallocation. The
1997-2001 period is of particular relevance as it witnessed not only the establishment of
EMU but also a sharp rise of the share of household savings allocated in international
stock and bond markets. The key ￿ndings of our analysis are:
￿ Financial integration is not a global phenomenon, as equity and bond home
biases ￿that is the tendency to invest in domestic assets ￿declined signi￿cantly only
among European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Equity and bond
home biases, however, continue to remain at relatively high levels. The signi￿cant
decreases in bond home biases for European countries are characterised by a strong
regional focus and are driven, to a certain extent, by the euro area itself. Therefore,
the dramatic increase in allocation of savings in capital markets, which has taking
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the euro area in both equity and bonds markets. After controlling for the e⁄ect of
a set of variables borrowed from the ￿nance literature, there is evidence of active
trading among euro area member states with euro area investors having assigned a
higher weight to portfolio investment in euro area countries. The average increase
in the weights ￿on top of the world average portfolio weight increase in euro area
assets ￿amounts to 12.7 and 22.4 percentage points for equity and bonds and notes
holdings respectively.
￿ Beside the e⁄ect of the EMU, the strongest determinants of the changes
in portfolio weights were (1) the need to diversify across several countries the risks
of holding foreign portfolio assets and (2) the willingness to close the gap between
actual shares of foreign investment and the share of foreign assets that would be held
in a ￿borderless￿global portfolio, which suggests that rational portfolio optimization
reasons were prime motives behind investor￿ s international portfolio reallocation. This
implies that (1) investors do not ignore the main principles of portfolio theory and
(2) portfolio investments might be less prone to "boom and bust cycles" relative to
other assets, being driven by long term economic fundamentals.
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The main objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international
portfolio reallocation for the 30 largest world economies over the period spanning 1997
to 2001. Of particular interest is to evaluate the e⁄ects of the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) on international portfolio reallocation. Documenting
a di⁄erential impact would have bearing on the assessment of the bene￿ts of the
adoption of the single currency on the degree of regional ￿nancial integration among
euro area member states.1
The impact of a currency union on ￿nancial markets is not well understood, as
it might not result in deeper ￿nancial integration (Rose, 2006). Therefore, it is
fundamental to assess whether the euro eased capital market access enhancing regional
and/or global ￿nancial integration.2
Speci￿cally, we investigate three sets of questions. First, we document whether
the reallocation of capital among countries over the 4 year period is due to a general
decline in home bias. Measuring the degree of home bias across countries and asset
classes as well as monitoring its evolution over time is fundamental in enhancing our
understanding of the global ￿nancial integration process. Second, we assess whether
the adoption of the euro has induced a portfolio reallocation towards euro area coun-
tries and/or within the euro area. Documenting the worldwide access to euro area
capital markets provides a benchmark for understanding whether regional ￿nancial
integration among euro area member states has deepened. Third, we investigate the
1There are two main approaches two measure the degree of ￿nancial integration. The price-based
measures assume the law of one price, which states that, in an integrated market, two identical
￿nancial products should be sold at the same price. The quantity-based measures used in this study
assume that, in an integrated market, cross-border capital ￿ ows should be able to meet any shortfall
in the domestic ￿nancing of aggregate investment (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Therefore, they
give information on the ease of market access and the size of portfolio home bias. In general, the
liberalization of portfolio ￿ ows and lower transaction costs to access non-domestic ￿nancial products
would facilitate the ￿ ow of capital to ￿rms and countries that have better investment opportunities,
thereby helping markets becoming more integrated (Stulz, 1999).
2A collection of stylised facts on the European ￿nancial integration based on price convergence
across a number of ￿nancial assets can be found in Baele et al (2004) and ECB (2005). A greater
degree of ￿nancial integration among countries belonging to a currency union is imperative, as it facil-
itates the smooth and e⁄ective transmission of monetary policy, enhances risk-sharing and supports
a better allocation of capital ￿thereby a⁄ecting positively economic growth. Moreover, it reduces
the volatility of asset prices in the presence of country-speci￿c adverse shocks, as a fall in asset prices
would be cushioned by capital in￿ ows.
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whether rational portfolio diversi￿cation motives can explain the reallocation deci-
sions of investors.
To address these fundamental issues we use bilateral cross-border equity and bond
holdings among 23 developed countries and 7 emerging market economies over the
period 1997-2001, covering 84% of world￿ s international investment in equity portfolios
and 71% of world￿ s international investment in bonds and notes portfolios in 2001.
The reference period per sØ is important from a ￿nancial integration perspective,
because it is characterised by three key stylised facts: (i) the sharp rise in cross-border
capital ￿ ows globally; (ii) the increased percentage of household savings invested
in capital markets and (iii) the establishment of EMU in January 1999 that was
a fundamental institutional change in the world economy. The key advantages of
using the portfolio weights at end-1997 and end-2001 are twofold: ￿rst, economic
fundamentals might play a much important role in a⁄ecting international investment
decisions in the longer term; second, the initial period is appropriate in measuring the
impact of euro adoption, as it places itself before the establishment of the European
Central Bank in June 1998, while the ￿nal period is chosen after the downturn in
stock markets that started in spring 2000.
We document that ￿nancial integration is not a global phenomenon, as equity and
bond home biases declined signi￿cantly only among European countries, Australia,
New Zealand and Singapore. Equity and bond home biases continue to remain at
relatively high levels. The signi￿cant decreases in bond home bias for European
countries are characterised by a strong regional focus and are driven, to a certain
extent, by the euro area itself. Therefore, the dramatic increase in allocation of
savings in capital markets, which has taken o⁄ in the mid 1990￿ s involved important
changes in investors￿preferences only in a group of countries.
To investigate whether the euro adoption enhanced regional ￿nancial integration,
we then employ a 30x29 country matrix of changes in portfolio weights over the period
1997-2001, which virtually include all major investment decisions. Of particular in-
terest are the bilateral factors that may explain why di⁄erent source countries attach
sharply di⁄erent weights across various host (destination) countries; thereby, allowing
to assess whether investors regard or ignore the main principles of portfolio theory.
After controlling for the e⁄ect of key variables borrowed from the ￿nance literature,
there is evidence of active portfolio re-balancing among euro area member states with
euro area investors having assigned a higher weight to portfolio investment in euro
area countries. The increase in the weights ￿on top of the world average portfolio
8
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respectively for equity and bonds and notes holdings.
Beside the impact of the EMU, we ￿nd that the strongest determinants of the
changes in portfolio weights were expected diversi￿cation bene￿ts and the initial dis-
tance from optimal portfolio weights (i.e. initial degree of underweight), suggesting
that rational portfolio optimization reasons are prime motives behind investors￿in-
ternational portfolio reallocation.
Recent developments in international ￿nancial markets have heightened the in-
terest in the issues investigated in this paper. First, there is evidence of increased
co-movements between the main economic and ￿nancial variables of the world￿ s largest
economies. The pattern of bilateral ￿nancial linkages may a⁄ect the level of inter-
national integration as well as in￿ uence the degree of business cycle synchronization
(Imbs, 2004). Second, the geography of investment positions heavily shapes inter-
national risk-sharing patterns, as risk is spread through asset market diversi￿cation
(Sorensen and Yoska, 1998). Third, there is compelling evidence that people invest in
the familiar (Huberman, 2001) and that home bias is a puzzle (Solnik, 1974b; French
and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995a and 1995b).
Although some authors already considered aspects of the geography of interna-
tional investment patterns, data limitations narrowed the focus of these contributions;
for example, only considering a single source country, most often the United States
being the recipient or the source of the investment.3 There is a rapidly expanding
literature trying to explain international patterns of bilateral investment. Typically,
this literature has studied the determinants of bank and portfolio holdings using em-
pirical methods borrowed from the gravity models of international goods trade.4 Our
paper is the ￿rst to study the determinants of bilateral changes in portfolio weights
in both equity securities and ￿xed income for a large cross section of countries and to
document the role of the EMU on portfolio re-balancing in international markets.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the em-
pirical approach. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 documents developments
in global ￿nancial integration. Section 5 investigates the determinants of portfolio
reallocation and assesses whether EMU enhanced ￿nancial integration by means of
an international portfolio choice model. Section 6 concludes.
3See for example Bohn and Tesar (1996), Brennan and Cao (1997), Coval and Moskowitz (1999),
Froot, O￿ Connell and Seasholes (2001), Huberman (2001), Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004).
4See for example Faruquee, Li and Yan (2004), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), Lane (2005),
Papaioannou (2005), Portes and Rey (2005).
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We take a portfolio approach to investigate the determinants of the changes in in-
ternational portfolio composition.5 Consider a representative investor from a generic
country c and let ￿c denote the investor￿ s degree of risk aversion. Also, indicate with
￿c the (N ￿1)-vector of expected returns in excess of the risk-free rate on the N risky
assets, and with ￿c the (N ￿ N)-covariance matrix for the risky assets, where the
subscript c indicates that returns are measured in the currency of country c. If the
investor faces no constraints on foreign holdings and ￿nancial markets are perfectly








c;t is the (N ￿ 1)-vector of optimal weights for the N risky assets.
Assuming that investor risk aversion does not change over the time, changes in
optimal portfolio weights re￿ ect either expectations on excess returns ￿c;t or changes
in the asset￿ s contribution to the overall portfolio risk as re￿ ected in changes in the
covariance matrix of returns. Therefore, the empirical model aiming at studying the
determinants of changes in portfolio weights ought to control for expected returns and
expected marginal diversi￿cation bene￿ts. Moreover, currency risk across euro area
member states was expected to become nil after the EMU. Therefore, when computing
the expected diversi￿cation bene￿ts arising from portfolio reallocation, one needs to
distinguish the asset speci￿c risk from the currency risk.
In practice, however, ￿nancial markets are not perfectly integrated, and some
countries impose restrictions on the foreign holdings of their nationals or on the
domestic holdings of foreign nationals. In this case, actual holdings may deviate from
the unconstrained mean-variance optimum and may exhibit signi￿cant home bias.
Therefore, a third regressor is needed to measure the initial misallocation or degree of
underweight in the destination country given the possibility of portfolio re-balancing
in the subsequent period, especially if the initial underweight is due to trade costs
that declined subsequently. Indeed, the bene￿ts of increased ￿nancial integration
should be most pronounced for the investors initially facing the highest barriers to
cross-border investment, and whose initial holdings were furthest from optimal.
In order to estimate also the e⁄ects of the EMU on global portfolio reallocation,
5Jorion and Khoury (1996, Ch 7, pp. 273-322) provide a lucid and detailed discussion of interna-
tional portfolio choice and pricing as well as references to the original contributions to the ￿eld.
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￿wck;t = ￿0 + ￿1DWck;t￿1 + ￿2DBck;t￿1 + ￿3Retk;t + ￿4Retk;t￿1 +
￿1Dk￿EMU + ￿2Dk￿EMU ￿ Dc￿EMU + ￿0Zck;t￿1
where ￿wck;t denotes the change in the share of country c￿ s international equity
portfolio invested in country k, DWck;t￿1 is the di⁄erence between the actual and
optimal share (initial degree of underweight) of country k assets in investor c portfolio,
DBck;t￿1 the aggregate marginal diversi￿cation bene￿t to investor c of increasing her
investment in country k assets, Retk;t the total returns on country k￿ s market portfolio
from time t ￿ 1 to t and D are binary variables used to capture the impact of the
EMU on international portfolio reallocation. Finally, Zck;t￿1 include three additional
control variables borrowed from the capital ￿ ow literature that control for structural
factors (i.e. distantness, population growth and institutional setting), which measured
ex-ante could have a role in the subsequent portfolio reallocation. The construction
of the variables is described in the following subsections.
2.1 Portfolio weights







where Invc;k is the US dollar amount invested by country c in country k ￿nancial
assets.
The change in foreign investment values from 1997 to 2001 could be due the
returns earned on the di⁄erent assets over the four year period, to new investments or
to reallocation of existing investment. Since the establishment of the EMU might have
eased capital market access, we are particularly interested in the active re-balancing,
that is the change in portfolio allocation that can be attributable to an investor
decision and action, ￿wA
ck;t. Therefore, we need to disentangle the portfolio weight
change due to return di⁄erentials from that due to investor reallocation decisions:
￿wA












k;t is the return on investment k denoted in country c￿ s currency and rc
Pc;t is
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the weights observed at the end of time t, the weights that would have been observed
had the investor bought and held his initial portfolio over the 4 years.8 Returns for
the di⁄erent foreign assets will be approximated by the total return on the equity and
bond market index respectively for each country.
In general, portfolio re-balancing may also occur by means of a passive strategy.
Especially if transaction costs are high, the accumulation of capital gains on foreign
holdings may be an e¢ cient and low-cost way to re-balance the portfolio. An active
and passive re-balancing is captured by the change in portfolio weights gross of the
capital gains/losses:
￿wB
ck;t = wck;t ￿ wck;t￿1:
Both strategies are investigated in the paper, although the active international
portfolio choice is the strategy to look at in order to assess whether the EMU enhanced
regional ￿nancial integration.
2.2 Marginal diversi￿cation bene￿ts and currency risk
Security risk can be diversi￿ed by constructing international portfolios of unrelated
countries￿assets. Speci￿cally, we compute the marginal impact on portfolio risk of
increasing or decreasing our position in a particular asset using the foreign investment




where wc;t is the actual vector of weights for the N foreign assets and the subscript
c indicates that the weights and the covariance matrix of returns are computed from
the investing country c￿ s perspective.
The decrease in portfolio variance for a marginal increase in the weight invested














7Since weigths are currency of denomination insensitive (Sercu, 1980), the adjustement can be
done with all returns denominated in US$ instead of the local currency.
8If the investor made additional investment over the period spanning the two survey dates, the
assumption would imply that new contributions were allocated using the portfolio shares observed
at the initial survey date.
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where DBck;t measures the diversi￿cation bene￿t of adding asset k to investor c￿ s
position. We should expect it to be positively related to changes in portfolio weights.
For an international investor, the return on any foreign asset varies not only be-
cause of asset speci￿c risk, but also because of unpredictable ￿ uctuations in exchange
rates. Currency risk is relevant not only for optimal portfolio construction (see De
Santis, Gerard and Hillion, 2002), but also for the determination of international as-
sets equilibrium returns (Adler and Dumas, 1983, De Santis and Gerard, 1998, De
Santis, Gerard and Hillion, 2003.) In our context currency risk is important on two
dimensions. First, since the currency risk exposure of asset portfolios can easily be
hedged through derivatives transactions, it may be of interest to distinguish between
the pure asset component and the currency risk component of the diversi￿cation ben-
e￿t motive of portfolio reallocation. Second, between the two sampling points, the
introduction of the single currency eliminated a substantial component of currency
risk for many international investments in our sample. By the end of 1997, when the
￿rst survey was conducted, the Maastricht process was well underway and investors
were keenly aware of the high likelihood that the intra-EMU currency risk would dis-
appear. Therefore, we would also like to disentangle the currency risk e⁄ects of the
adoption of the Euro from the aggregate currency risk e⁄ects of a change in portfolio
allocation.
Consider an investor from a euro area member state, e.g. a Dutch investor. When,
in 1997, she considers investing in ￿nancial assets traded in another euro area country,
she is aware of the high likelihood of the disappearance of the currency risk component
of the total risk of her investment, and she considers only the ￿fully hedged￿asset risk,
that is the pure asset component of the asset risk. When she considers investing in
assets traded outside the euro area, she is aware that the share of the asset￿ s currency
risk related to intra-euro area currency ￿ uctuations will disappear, but that she will
remain exposed to the ￿ uctuations of the euro relative to the currency in which the
foreign investment is made. As an approximation, she could consider the investment
as if she was a German investor. For investments outside the euro area she would
then consider (a) the ￿fully hedged￿risk of the asset, and (b) the currency risk of the
asset as if she was a German investor.
Consider an investor from outside the euro area, e.g. a US investor. When she
considers investing in ￿nancial assets traded in a euro area country, she is also aware
of the high likelihood of the disappearance of the part of the asset￿ s currency risk
13
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exposed to the ￿ uctuations of the euro relative to her domestic currency. For an
investment within the euro area, she considers (a) the ￿fully hedged￿asset risk, and
(b) the currency risk of the asset as if the asset was a German asset. When she
considers investing in assets traded outside the euro area, she recognizes that she will
be exposed fully to both the asset￿ s intrinsic risk and to the full currency risk related
to the ￿ uctuations of her domestic currency relative to the currency in which the
foreign investment is made. Therefore, for an investment outside the euro area, she
considers (a) the ￿fully hedged￿asset risk and (b) the full currency risk of the asset.
To make the argument slightly more formal, denote with r the continuously com-










k is the return on country k portfolio denominated in currency c, and xc
k the
log of the change in the exchange rate between currency k and currency c. The ￿rst
part of the equation is the well known decomposition of foreign investment returns in
local asset return and currency return. The second equality re￿ ects the no-triangular
arbitrage condition for exchange rates.
We will consider three measures of diversi￿cation bene￿ts: (i) an aggregate mea-
sure of diversi￿cation bene￿ts based on the investor￿ s foreign investments returns
denominated in his domestic currency, DB
Agg
ck = DB(rc
k); (ii) a measure of diver-
si￿cation bene￿ts based on the investor￿ s foreign investments fully hedged returns,
DBFH
ck = DB(rk
k); and (iii) a measure of diversi￿cation bene￿ts based on the cur-
rency component of the investor￿ s foreign investments, DBCurr
ck = DB(xc
k). The ￿rst
measure is based on the covariance of asset returns measured in the investor￿ s domestic
currency and the investors starting portfolio weights, and combines both the impact
of currency risk and fundamental asset risk. The second measure is a function of the
covariance of asset returns measured in the asset￿ s local currency and the investors
starting portfolio weights. The third measure is based on the covariance of foreign
currency returns expressed in the investor￿ s domestic currency, and of the investor￿ s
starting portfolio weights. Therefore, both determinants of the diversi￿cation bene-
￿t, i.e. the covariance matrix of returns and the weights, are investor speci￿c for the
￿rst and third measures; while, for the second measure, the covariance of local asset
returns is common to investors from all countries, but the starting portfolio weights
14
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The ￿rst two measures of the diversi￿cation bene￿t are easy to compute based
on investor￿ s currency denominated asset returns and local currency denominated
returns respectively. The third measure, the currency component of the investor￿ s







In the context of the adoption of the single currency, we want to distinguish be-
tween the fraction of the currency component of the diversi￿cation bene￿ts due to
intra-EMU currency ￿ uctuations and that part due to extra-EMU currency ￿ uctua-
tions. The bene￿ts from diversifying intra-EMU currency risk would be expected to
disappear with the introduction of the Euro, while the risk associated with currency
￿ uctuations outside the EMU zone would persist. Rational investors would take the
second one into account when re-balancing, while ignoring the ￿rst one. To imple-








where X-EMU denote currency ￿ uctuations external to the EMU, and EMU denote
currency ￿ uctuations internal to the euro area.
For investments made by a euro area member state in another euro area country,
the external currency risk is inexistent and
DB
Curr;X￿EMU




For investments made by a non-EMU member outside the euro area, the currency
risk internal to the euro area is inexistent and
DB
Curr;EMU




9This discussion and the derivation of the diversi￿cation bene￿t are based on the implicit assump-
tion that asset￿ s local currency returns and exchange rate changes are uncorrelated. Although the
covariance between local asset returns and exchange rate changes is non zero (see for example De
Santis and Gerard, 1998; Cappiello and De Santis, 2005), explicitly considering non-zero covariances
between local asset return and exchange rates will not a⁄ect the decomposition and the derivation
materially and carry a considerable cost in terms of complexity, notation and intuition. Such a deriva-
tion is available from the authors on request. In the empirical exercise, however, these covariances
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non-EMU members inside the euro area both components of currency risk may a⁄ect
investment decisions. To estimate the internal-EMU currency risk component, we will
compute the total diversi￿cation bene￿t as if there were no internal currency ￿ uctua-
tions. The di⁄erence between the currency component of the investor￿ s diversi￿cation
bene￿t and our aggregate external diversi￿cation bene￿t will give us the estimate of
the internal-EMU currency risk component.
The computation of diversi￿cation bene￿ts
Investment to:
Investment EMU country
from: (k 2 EMU)
A. EMU country DB
Curr;X￿EMU
ck = 0























(k = 2 EMU)






















(c = 2 EMU) DB
Curr;EMU
ck = 0
We need to make a critical assumption for implementing the decomposition. We as-
sume that prior to the adoption of the single currency, the Deutsche Mark was viewed
by world investors as the currency to which the single currency would most closely
relate in terms of exchange rate characteristics. This is a reasonable assumption as
the characteristics of the ECU, the joint unit of account that preceded the Euro, were
very similar to that of the DEM. That is, we assume that when investing in France,
to compute her aggregate external diversi￿cation bene￿ts a US investor would con-
sider the fully hedged local French equity returns and only the currency ￿ uctuations
16
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a French investor investing in the US would consider the fully hedged local US equity
returns and only the currency ￿ uctuations between the US$ and DEM in order to
compute her aggregate external diversi￿cation bene￿ts measure (see case C).
Since re-balancing a portfolio entails transaction costs, it is unlikely to take place
when estimated marginal diversi￿cation bene￿ts are of small magnitude. Therefore, to








ck are squared, when they are positive; and squared and multiplied
by minus one, when they are negative.
2.3 Asset returns
Changes in portfolio allocation should be related to the expected returns of each asset.
Brennan and Cao (1997) and Froot, O￿ Connell and Seasholes (2001) ￿nd a positive
contemporaneous relationship between portfolio ￿ ows and contemporaneous returns
unadjusted for portfolio risk. The contemporaneous correlation may be due to infor-
mational disadvantages by global investors relative to domestic investors, who have
better knowledge of local market￿ s economic conditions. The positive information
releases unexpected by global investors will then in￿ uence the international alloca-
tion of portfolio holdings, as foreign investors purchase more of the domestic market
portfolio from the better informed domestic investors.
Bohn and Tesar (1996) and Froot, O￿ Connell and Seasholes (2001) found that
international portfolio ￿ ows co-move with lagged measures of expected returns. This
suggests that international investors engage in positive feedback trading, also called
￿trend chasing￿ .
2.4 Misallocation and degree of underweight
Since re-balancing a portfolio entails both direct and indirect transaction costs, it is
unlikely to take place when actual portfolio weights di⁄er only slightly from optimal
portfolio weights. However, the larger the di⁄erence between actual and optimal share
at the beginning of the sample the stronger the incentive to trade back to optimal
weights, reducing the position when the actual weight exceeds the optimal weight and
increasing your investments in an asset when it is under-weighted, especially if the
initial underweight is due to trade costs that declined subsequently.
We use market capitalization to compute optimal weights. Since our data focus
exclusively on the foreign holdings of each country, the optimal weight to be invested
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market index excluding the investing country c. Let w￿
c and w￿
k denote the mar-
ket capitalization weight of countries c and k in the total world market portfolio,
respectively. Then, the degree of underweight can be computed as follows:
DWck;t = w￿







2.5 EMU impact on international portfolio allocations
To measure the average impact of the EMU on international portfolio allocations, we
include two sets of binary variables. First we include a dummy which takes the value
of 1 if the country receiving the investment belongs to the EMU. The coe¢ cient of
this dummy measure the average change in percentage points of the allocation to
individual EMU countries for all investors. However, the e⁄ect of the single currency
may be more pronounced on the investment decisions of investors residents in the
euro area. To control for this di⁄erential e⁄ect, we include a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 when both investing and receiving countries belong to the EMU.
The coe¢ cient of this dummy measure the average change in percentage points of the
allocation to individual EMU countries for EMU investors that comes in addition to
the average change observed for all investors. Accordingly, it quanti￿es the average
￿nancial integration e⁄ect of euro adoption for the individual euro area member state.
A further complication comes from the role of the London market as a major
European intermediary of foreign investments from and to the rest of the world. Due
to the large size and higher sophistication of the London markets, many euro area
investors and foreign investors in the euro area choose the London stock exchange
to make their cross-border investments. The IMF data on portfolio holdings report
an accurate country breakdown of bilateral investment, which tries to identify the
residence of the issuer. Nevertheless, since the city of London is a key European player
in the ￿nancial markets, we control for that by including two additional dummies.
The ￿rst dummy takes a value of 1 if the receiving country is the UK. A second
dummy takes the value of 1 if the investing country belongs to the EMU and the
receiving country is the UK.
2.6 Other control variables
Other control variable as in 1997 include trade intensity in goods and services, popu-
lation ageing, and investors￿perceived corruption, the latter used as a measure of the
quality of the institutions in the destination country.
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costs. Trade in goods and services could reduce distantness and facilitate the infor-
mation ￿ ow across trade partners increasing the willingness to conduct cross-border
portfolio transactions. However, trade costs can also explain the equity portfolio
home bias (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2001). In both interpretations, the deeper the trade
relationship between countries at the beginning of the sample, the bigger the portfolio
reallocation in favour of the trade partner. Trade intensity is measured as the sum
between the export share of the investing country c in the receiving country k and
the export share of country k in country c.
A structural determinant of national savings is the demographic pro￿le of a coun-
try. Relatively high youth and old-age dependency ratios would bring about net
capital in￿ ows, as a relatively large population of dependent young and old has a
relatively lower savings rate (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). However, the expected
positive relationship between dependency ratios and net capital in￿ ows might not
hold for all types of portfolio ￿ ows. If pensioners￿savings were reallocated from eq-
uity securities to less risky assets, such as global government bonds, then the link
with the dependency ratios would di⁄er between types of portfolio ￿ ows. In gen-
eral, households might take less ￿nancial risk, as they reach their retirement years
(Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra, 2002). For a more risk-adverse investor, the
rational response is to demand higher returns on stock and/or a move to ￿xed income
investment.10 Alternatively, if cross-border capital ￿ ows were limited due to home
bias, trade restrictions or large transaction costs, developed countries with a shrinking
workforce could face an asset melt-down (i.e. a rapid fall in securities prices due to a
withdrawal of assets by the retiring baby-boomers).
Several studies argue that institutions matter in shaping the ￿ ow of capital across
countries (Alfaro, et al, 2005; De Santis and L￿hrmann, 2006). International in-
vestment decisions are a⁄ected by risks as well as by countries￿corruption, turmoil,
violence, instability, rule of law, property rights, freedom in￿ uence economic market
sentiment. In general investors prefer to purchase or hold assets of countries with a
10Findings by Riley and Chow (1992), for example, indicate a U-shaped relationship between
relative risk aversion and age. Similarly, Ameriks and Zeldes (2000) estimated a hump-shaped age
e⁄ect on the fraction of household ￿nancial assets held in equity securities. Heaton and Lucas (2000)
found that the share of equity relative to marketable ￿nancial assets declines above age 65, but
this e⁄ect disappears when the wealth measure includes private business. De Santis and L￿hrmann
(2006) show evidence that countries with relatively higher youth and old-age dependency ratios are
associated with net equity in￿ ows, while countries with a relatively higher old-age dependency ratio
is associated with net out￿ ows in debt instruments.
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tion perceptions index score, which measures the degree of corruption in country k
as perceived by business people and country analysts.
3 Data
The primary source for portfolio holdings is the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey (CPIS) conducted by the IMF and described more fully in the next sub-section.
The CPIS reports for each investing country the total amount, denominated in US
dollar, of foreign investment at the end of 1997 and at the end of 2001. Moreover, the
data provide a geographical breakdown of international equity and bond holdings at
the end of 1997 and of 2001 by 29 and 67 source countries, respectively. This include
virtually all major international investors. Therefore, it allows one to explore the
determinants of international portfolio positions in a comprehensive manner. Addi-
tional data compiled by the World Bank, Thomson Datastream and JP Morgan are
used as the main data sources to construct the control variables.
3.1 International portfolio holdings
The geography of international investment has not been investigated in depth in the
literature due to the lack of a consistent database on international portfolio allocation.
In this paper, we use the IMF CPIS database, which reports the international port-
folio positions disaggregated by regions and instruments. More speci￿cally, the CPIS
dataset provides a geographical breakdown of international portfolio holdings disag-
gregated by three instruments ￿equity securities, bonds and notes and money market
instruments, and includes virtually all major international investors. An additional
advantage of this dataset is the consistency of the compilation criteria:
￿ participants undertake a benchmark portfolio asset survey at the same time;
￿ participants follow de￿nitions and classi￿cations that are mutually consis-
tent by following the same methodology;
￿ all participants provide a breakdown of their stock of portfolio investment
assets by the country of residency of the non-resident issuer.
The database for the year 1997 covers 29 of the largest economies in the world,
nine of which belonging to the euro area ￿Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain -, the three old EU member states but not
members of the euro area ￿Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom -, another
ten developed countries ￿Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New
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Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand - and three Latin American emerging markets
￿Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. Germany did not report data in 1997, but did so
in 2001. Since Germany is a key euro area member and its international portfolio
holdings are substantial, we used an annual database on international investment
positions from the Bundesbank to derive the geographical allocation of equities and
bonds and notes position abroad held by German residents at end-1997. Speci￿cally,
we use the Bundesbank 1997 and 2001 records and adjust all the 1997 positions
consistently (including exchange rate movements) to make them comparable to the
2001 holdings recorded in the CPIS.
At the end of 2001, 12.7 trillions of US dollars (that is, 50% of total GDP of
OECD countries) were invested internationally, mostly in equity securities (40.9%)
and bonds and notes (50.6%). Ten developed countries - the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland and six euro area countries - held 72.2% of all
international portfolio holdings. Similarly, few developed countries host most of the
international portfolio investment. The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Cayman Islands, Canada and ￿ve euro area countries were recipient of 74.1% of all
international portfolio holdings (see Table 1).
It is interesting to point out that the United States held USD 1.6 trillion in
foreign equity securities and only USD 0.6 trillion in foreign bonds and notes. Japan
instead held only USD 0.2 trillion in foreign equity securities and USD 1 trillion in
foreign bonds and notes. Conversely, the six euro area countries held 1.5 trillion
in foreign equity securities and USD 2 trillion in foreign bonds and notes. Clearly,
investors from di⁄erent countries appear to have very di⁄erent global asset allocation
strategies, which may re￿ ect di⁄erences in appetite for risk across the world.
With regard to the liability side of portfolio international investment, foreign
investors held USD 1 trillion of US equity securities and USD 1.7 trillion of US bonds
and notes. They also held respectively USD 1.5 trillion and USD 2.1 trillion of equity
securities and bonds and notes issued by residents of the six euro area countries. In
other words, the United States and the euro area are the main recipients of foreign
capital. When examining the changes from 1997 to 2001 across the main regions of
the world, it is evident that international portfolio allocation increased in developed
countries while remaining small in emerging markets (see Figure 1).
In all, we employ a matrix formed by 30 countries from 1 year before (end-1997)
to 3 year after (end-2001) the launch of the Euro, in order to study the medium
term determinants of changes in portfolio weights and the impact of EMU on inter-
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procedure also has the advantage of abstracting from short-run variations in interna-
tional portfolio holdings, which could be due to unexpected economic news, cyclical
developments as well as phenomena which are di¢ cult to pin down.11
3.2 Other data
To compute the optimal portfolio weights needed to generate appropriate measures
of home bias and misallocation, we use the country weights in the Datastream total
world index equity portfolio on December 31, 1997 and December 31, 2001, as proxies
for the true market capitalization weights. As bond market total capitalization is not
readily available for all countries in the sample, the optimal country bonds portfolios
weights are estimated as the ratio of the country￿ s GDP to the world aggregate GDP
in 1997 and 2001 respectively.12 The actual share of a country￿ s foreign holdings is
computed as the ratio of the country￿ s foreign holdings to the country￿ s total country
portfolio holdings. For equities we estimate total country holdings as the sum of the
domestic equity market capitalization provided by Datastream plus the country￿ s for-
eign holdings, minus the sum of foreigners holdings of that country￿ s equity. For bond
portfolio, we use the same approach where domestic bond market value is estimated
as the nominal value of all domestically issued debt provided by the BIS.
To estimate the covariance matrix needed to compute the expected marginal di-
versi￿cation bene￿ts (see Appendix), we use weekly equity returns on the Datastream
total market index and weekly bond returns on the JP Morgan total market index
for each country denominated in local currency and in US dollars, from December 92
to December 97. Weekly bilateral exchange rates are also provided by Datastream.
Trade intensity is constructed using IMF data on bilateral trade in goods and
services. Population ageing in country k consists of two variables constructed using
11To eliminate outliers from the sample, we adopted two sample ￿ltering criteria. We excluded from
the database the investing countries that allocated explicitly to speci￿c receiving countries less than
75% of their international portfolio either in 1997 or in 2001, or those countries that held less than
100 million of US dollar in their international portfolio in 1997 or in 2001. Therefore, we excluded
the investment of Argentina, Indonesia, Israel, Thailand and Venezuela from the equity holdings
database and the investment of Iceland, Israel and New Zealand from the long-term debt instrument
holdings database. Moreover, we excluded all zero entries. Hence, the original databases with 870
observations ended up with 667 observations for the equity holdings and with 639 observations for
the long-term debt instruments holdings.
12We have also used the countries￿bond outstanding at nominal values, and the optimal country
bond portfolio weights remain invariant.
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0-15/15-65) and the relative old-age dependency ratio (i.e. age: 65+/15-65) of the
recipient country relative to the world average. The corruption perceptions index
score compiled by Transparency International ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and
1 (highly clean).
4 Global ￿nancial integration
A typical measure used to document the ￿nancial integration of a country in the global
￿nancial system is home bias (HBc;t), which is broadly de￿ned as the tendency to
invest more in domestic assets, even though the risk is shared more e⁄ectively if
foreign assets are held. Hence, the extent of a country￿ s home bias is a sign that
￿nancial integration is still not complete. Due to data limitation at global scale, the
development over time of home bias is often documented for the United States only
(Ahearne, Griever and Warnock, 2004). We show developments of home bias for
30 countries in equity and bond markets and assess whether its decline is a global
phenomenon and/or asset speci￿c.
An index that is generally used to measure home bias is one minus the Foreign
Asset Acceptance Ratio (FAAR).13 FAAR measures the extent to which the share
of foreign assets in an investor￿ s portfolio diverges from the share of foreign assets
that would be held in a "borderless" global portfolio. By this metric, home bias is
higher, the lower FAAR is from unity. Speci￿cally, FAAR is computed as the actual
share of foreign assets in total country holdings (wcf;t ) divided by the optimal share
of foreign assets in the total country portfolio (w￿
cf;t ). This implies that HBc;t =
1 ￿ wcf;t=w￿
cf;t:14
To identify an observable estimate of the optimal shares, we call upon ￿nance
theory. In a fully integrated world where PPP holds, Solnik (1974a) and Sercu (1980)
show that the international version of the simple CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner
(1965) holds. Moreover, the equilibrium is achieved when all investors hold the world
market portfolio, where each country portfolio is weighted by its market capitalization.
13See for example Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) and IMF (2005).
14This measure has also several limitations. As pointed out by the IMF (2005), some investors
may have good reasons for preferring domestic to foreign assets under certain conditions. Moreover,
FAAR measures only consider the market in which a ￿rm is listed, even if the ￿rm is global in scope.
Accordingly, the FAAR index may understate the overall degree of actual diversi￿cation of investors
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market capitalization weight in the world index portfolio. By the same token, for each
country, the optimal share invested abroad (w￿
cf;t ) should be equal to 1 minus the
investing country￿ s market weight in the world index. The higher HBc;t, the more
home bias the portfolio exhibits.
Table 2 reports our estimates of the degree of home bias in the aggregate equity and
￿xed income portfolios of the countries in the sample. Our computations suggest that
portfolio home bias is generally high across countries. Among the largest developed
economies, Japan and Spain have the highest measured home bias in equity markets
amounting to 88% and 80% in 2001 respectively; while the United States and Canada
have the largest home bias in ￿xed income markets equalling 92% and 93% in 2001
respectively. Euro area member states and small developed economies such as New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Singapore reported a large decline in home bias in both
assets. Conversely, the home bias in the United States and Japan did not change much
over the four year period.15
Turning to economic regions, non-EU developed countries and emerging market
economies show very high levels of home bias in both equity and bond portfolios. This
contrasts with the much lower average home bias in EU member states (see Figure
2). The average home bias across euro area countries was 63% in equity markets and
sizably lower for bond markets (44%). However, when considering the euro area as one
economic region (excluding intra-asset trade among euro area member states), equity
and bond home bias measures in the euro area decline but to a lower extent and in
2001 amounted to 75% in equity markets and 68% in bond markets, suggesting a large
reallocation within the euro area, particularly in the bond portfolios (see Figure 2).
The larger decline in home bias by euro area member states relative to the euro area
as a whole implies that the increased interest in foreign assets by euro area investors
did not divert asset trade from other euro area member states.
All in all, ￿nancial integration is not a global phenomenon, as equity and bond
home biases declined only among European countries, Australia, New Zealand and
Singapore. Equity and bond home biases continue also to remain at relatively high
levels. The signi￿cant decreases in bond home bias for European countries are char-
acterised by a strong regional focus and are driven, to a certain extent, by the euro
area itself.
15The degree and the change in home bias estimated for the US equity markets are similar to
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We presented evidence that equity and bond home biases have decreased signi￿cantly
across European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Other developed
countries and the emerging markets did not experience a change in their preferences
for domestic and foreign assets. The larger average decline in home bias in the euro
area provides also tentative signs that euro area ￿nancial markets could have become
more integrated owing to the formation of the EMU. In this section, we show that
the reduction in home bias has been accompanied by a large shift in holdings towards
other euro area countries and that the EMU had a large impact on portfolio asset
trade among euro area member states.
Tables 3 and 4 report the countries￿share of assets issued by residents in the
euro area in 1997 and 2001 respectively in their international and total portfolios.
Euro area countries and in general European countries have increased the share of
EMU assets as a fraction their portfolio holdings, particularly in bond portfolios.16
The international portfolio holdings issued by euro area residents increased for EU
member states and the emerging markets in equity holdings and across all countries in
bonds and notes holdings (see Figures 3 and 4). While the intra euro area allocation
of equities slightly increased, intra euro area investment in bonds rose sharply.
This stylised facts point to enhanced regional ￿nancial integration among euro
area member states over the 1997-2001 period. Since there could be several economic
reasons to invest in EMU assets, we have still to prove the ￿pure￿regional integration
e⁄ect of the EMU.
To investigate whether these general results are valid when looking at bilateral
variations in portfolio allocation, we estimate an international portfolio choice model.
The model looks at the bilateral variations in portfolio allocation among the 30 coun-
tries in our sample over the period 1997-2001.
We ￿rst investigate the determinants of active re-balancing and control for the
degree of underweight at the beginning of the sample, the bene￿t arising from ex-
pected portfolio diversi￿cation and market performance, so that we can estimate the
quantity-based ￿nancial integration index among euro area member states by means
of binary variables.
The econometric results summarised in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the EMU
played a key role in the reallocation of capital among countries worldwide as well as
16Tables and Figures 3 and 4 are constructed including the portfolio assets issued by residents of
Luxemburg. The investing euro area countries continue to be the 10 member states listed in section
3.1 for which the geographical portfolio allocation is available.
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tially international risk-sharing. Due to the establishment of the EMU, the portfolio
weights assigned by euro area investors to portfolio investment in euro area countries
increased in equity portfolios and bonds and notes portfolios (see coe¢ cient on D2).
This trade creation e⁄ect (i.e. Rose e⁄ect in the asset market) among euro area mem-
ber states is statistically signi￿cant at 1% in both markets and this gain is on top of
the mere elimination of the exchange rate risk, the latter captured by DBEMU
ck;t￿1.17
Beside the EMU e⁄ect, pointing towards enhanced ￿nancial integration among
euro area member states in both equity and ￿xed income markets, we ￿nd that the
strongest determinants of the changes in portfolio weights are (1) the need to diversify
across several countries the risks of holding foreign portfolio assets (i.e. expected
diversi￿cation bene￿ts) and (2) the willingness to close the gap between actual foreign
investment weights and the share of foreign assets that would be held in a ￿borderless￿
global portfolio (i.e. receiving country underweight). The latter variables increases
the adjusted R2 by approximately 20 percentage points in both equity and ￿xed
income portfolios.
On the one hand, the expected diversi￿cation bene￿t is not signi￿cant if the ￿fully
hedged￿risk is aggregated with the currency risk of the asset (see speci￿cations 2 in
Tables 5 and 6). On the other hand, the ￿fully hedged￿asset risk set alone plays
an important role in explaining changes in portfolio weights in both assets and, most
importantly, in equity portfolios as the adjusted R2 increases by an additional 16
p.p. (see speci￿cations 3 in Tables 5 and 6). We would indeed normally expect that
adding securities to the portfolio will tend to reduce portfolio risk. The diversi￿-
cation bene￿ts arising from the currency component are insigni￿cant for expected
currency ￿ uctuations external to the euro area, and signi￿cant, positive and small for
expected currency ￿ uctuations within EMU, but only for the equity portfolio model.
These ￿ndings imply that investors might have preferred to hedge against exchange
rate risks, as there is no strong evidence of diversi￿cation bene￿ts from the currency
component (see speci￿cations 4-5 in Tables 5 and 6). Finally, particularly past per-
formance is important for the allocation of bond portfolios.18
Given the sizeable adjusted R2, these results suggest that rational portfolio op-
17Rose (2000) ￿nds strong evidence of a positive impact of currency unions on commodity trade,
particularly for smaller countries.
18De Santis and L￿hrmann (2006) showed that net equity ￿ ows are not a⁄ected by stocks￿past
performance, while net ￿ ows in debt instruments are driven by lagged long-term yield di⁄erentials.
The e⁄ect of the redemption yield is positive in the medium term (momentum motive), but negative
in the shorter run (portfolio re-balancing motive).
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allocation in the long term.
We also investigate the determinants of the active and passive re-balancing strat-
egy. In this case, the change in portfolio weights is mostly function of the initial degree
of underweight in the destination country (see Table 7). The e⁄ect of the expected
diversi￿cation bene￿ts is washed away because investors tend to add securities to the
portfolio in order to reduce overall portfolio risk as found in the speci￿cations with
the active re-balancing only.
As for the other explanatory variables of changes in portfolio weights, bilateral
trade intensity at the beginning of the sample a⁄ects the subsequent reallocation of
equity portfolios as well as bonds and notes portfolios in both models. The stronger
the bilateral trade relationship in goods and services, the lower the distantness and the
information asymmetry, the higher the reallocation of the portfolio. As for the ageing
variables, the result indicate that investors in ￿xed income preferred to reallocated
away from countries that are ageing. If this result is con￿rmed by other studies, bond
prices could be strongly negatively a⁄ected after the retirement of the baby-boom
generation, supporting therefore the "asset melt-down" hypothesis in ￿xed income
markets. Finally, there is mild evidence to reallocate away from the bond markets of
countries where the degree of corruption was perceived to be high at the beginning
of the sample.19 All in all, by adding additional control variables, the results on the
key variables forming the international portfolio choice model remain invariant.
By focusing on the active re-balancing model speci￿cations, we can re￿ne the
estimates of the impact of the single currency on market access. The portfolio weights
assigned by euro area investors to portfolio investment in euro area countries increased
by 12.7 p.p. (0.014 multiplied by 9 countries) in equity portfolios and by 22.4 p.p.
(0.025 multiplied by 9 countries) in bonds and notes portfolios. Moreover, all countries
of the world in the sample have increased their relative investment in the euro area by
6.2 p.p. (0.006 multiplied by 10 euro area countries) in equity securities and 18.1 p.p.
(0.018 multiplied by 10 euro area countries) in bonds and notes. Furthermore, the
British weight in euro area portfolio holdings increased by 3.2. p.p. in equity portfolios
(trade creating e⁄ect) and declined by 3.8 p.p. and bonds and notes portfolios (trade
diverting e⁄ect). This implies that, if the city of London were trading assets issued
19We have also used alternative proxies for the instituional framework, such as the repudiation
and the risk of expropriation of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998), the Civil Liberties of
Freedom House and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Regardless of the indeces used,
the results are similar.
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quantity-based ￿nancial integration e⁄ect due to the establishment of EMU would at
most amount to 15.9 p.p in the equity market and 20.6 p.p in the bond market.
How robust are the results when the smaller investing countries are excluded from
the analysis? This question is important because the change in portfolio weights for
i.e. the pair US-Germany has the same weight as for i.e. the pair Iceland-Chile.
Table 8 reports the results when excluding the smallest investing countries with a
GDP below USD 100 billion in 2001; these are Bermuda, Chile, Iceland, Malaysia,
New Zealand and Singapore.20 The results are generally very similar to those reported
in Table 7. Should we worry about investment in ￿nancial centres such as Bermuda?
The econometric results so far discussed would not change whatsoever when removing
Bermuda as a recipient of international investment.
The analysis focused on changes in demand pointing to a signi￿cant shift in equity
and bond portfolios among euro area countries. Could important shifts occurring also
on the supply side a⁄ect the results? The Maastricht accord imposed tight restrictions
on government debt. The e⁄ects of this, however, were not symmetric across countries,
and may have had a signi￿cant impact on the composition of ￿xed income securities
available to investors. To assess whether the results remain robust to changes on the
supply side, we use BIS data to compute the net new international equity and bond
issues (the di⁄erence between completed issues and redemptions in a given period)
over the period 1998-2001, which permit to measure the amount of new fund raised on
the international markets. The net issuance of each individual country is then scaled
by the total country portfolio. The results indicate that the investors￿portfolio re-
balancing has been also a⁄ected by the new fund raised on the international equity
markets by the destination country and that all the coe¢ cients on the other variables
continue to remain robust (see Table 9).
6 Conclusions
Financial systems in general serve not only to channel funds from those who have
a surplus to those who have a shortage of savings, but they also serve to trade,
hedge, diversify and pool risk. These functions help us to understand the economic
bene￿ts that can be derived from ￿nancial integration. There are two widely accepted
economic bene￿ts of ￿nancial integration: ￿rst, the better sharing and diversi￿cation
20The GDP of Israel amounted to USD 114 billion in 2001, but this country was already excluded
from the main analysis for other reasons explained in the data section.
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The establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Jan-
uary 1999 has been a fundamental institutional change in the world economy, which
has reshaped ￿nancial systems and could help explaining the large reallocation of cap-
ital that took place worldwide. Therefore, this paper investigates the determinants of
international portfolio reallocation for the 30 largest world economies over the period
spanning 1997 to 2001 and evaluate the e⁄ects of the EMU on international alloca-
tion of equity and ￿xed income portfolios. Moreover, the sharp rise in cross-border
capital ￿ ows globally and the increased percentage of household savings invested in
international capital markets might have enhanced global ￿nancial integration.
Hence, we examine three sets of questions. First, we assess whether the degree
of home bias has changed over the 4 year period. Second, we investigate whether
the EMU has induced a portfolio reallocation towards euro area countries, within the
euro area or among all countries. Third, we explore the determinants of international
portfolio reallocation and in particular test whether rational portfolio diversi￿cation
motives can explain the reallocation decisions of investors.
We document that global ￿nancial integration strengthened only across some
countries over the 1997 to 2001 period. This is re￿ ected in the signi￿cant average
decline of home bias across the European countries, Australia, new Zealand and Sin-
gapore in both equity and bond markets. We also ￿nd that the decline in home bias
was on average signi￿cantly more pronounced for euro area member states. This is
due to the EMU, which has enhanced regional ￿nancial integration among euro area
member states by easing market access in both equity and bonds markets. After
controlling for the e⁄ect of a set of variables borrowed from the ￿nance literature,
we uncover evidence of euro area investors having assigned a higher weight to port-
folio investment in euro area countries, which implies that the EMU has facilitated
portfolio market access.
Beside the e⁄ect of the EMU, we ￿nd that the strongest determinants of the
changes in portfolio weights are (i) the need to diversify across several countries the
risks of holding foreign portfolio assets and (ii) the willingness to close the gap between
actual shares of foreign investment and the share of foreign assets that would be held
in a ￿borderless￿global portfolio, which suggests that rational portfolio optimization
reasons are prime motives behind investor￿ s international portfolio reallocation. This
implies that (i) investors do not ignore the main principles of portfolio theory and (ii)
portfolio investments might be less prone to "boom and bust cycles" relative to other
assets, being driven by long-term economic fundamentals.
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May 2006Appendix: Estimating the covariance matrix
Accurate estimates of the covariance matrix of returns are critical for a good estimate
of the expected portfolio risk and diversi￿cation bene￿ts associated with di⁄erent
assets. We use 5 years of weekly returns data, rc (x), to compute the covariance
matrix. To re￿ ect the time varying nature of volatility and correlations, we estimate
the covariance matrix using the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA)
procedure advocated by De Santis et al (2003) adjusting for serial correlation at lag
1 and using decay parameters of 0.98 at the weekly frequency for variance estimation
and decay parameter of 0.995 at weekly frequency for correlation estimation. The
weighting scheme assigns a weight of 1 to the most recent observation t.
More speci￿cally, the covariance matrix (￿) can be decomposed as follows:
￿ = D￿D0
where D is the diagonal matrix of return volatility, as measured by the standard
deviations, and ￿ is the corresponding correlation matrix. This decomposition has a
strong practical appeal since one can estimate volatility,
^
var[rc (x)], and correlations,
^
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Top Ten Economies by Size of Portfolio Investment Holdings in 2001 (US$ billions)
All foreign holdings come from the IMF CPIS data base. The values reported for the euro
area grouping is the sum of holdings of 10 euro area member states.
Country Equity Bonds Money Total
& notes market
Assets
United States 1613 555 136 2304
United Kingdom 558 667 78 1304
Japan 227 1005 58 1290
Luxemburg 319 414 87 821
Germany 381 402 9 792
France 202 462 46 710
Italy 239 308 5 552
Switzerland 247 228 14 489
Netherlands 235 245 6 486
Ireland 134 184 115 433
Others 1044 1957 530 3532
Total Investment 5200 6426 1084 12711
Liabilities
United States 1027 1661 413 3101
United Kingdom 713 395 181 1290
Germany 273 806 87 1167
France 390 337 50 777
Netherlands 289 376 40 705
Italy 120 428 32 580
Japan 332 169 41 542
Luxemburg 380 134 12 525
Cayman Islands 98 294 24 416
Canada 97 207 15 320
Others 1480 1610 191 3288
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The Home Bias Decline in Equity and Bond Portfolios
The table reports the measure of home bias in aggregate equity and bond portfolios for the 30 countries in
our sample at the end of 1997 and 2001. The home bias measure is computed as one minus the actual share
of foreign assets in the total country portfolio divided the optimal share of foreign assets in total country
holdings. The optimal share invested abroad is estimated as to 1 minus the country market weight in the
world index. The actual share is computed as the ratio between the country￿ s total foreign portfolio holdings
and the country￿ s total country portfolio holdings. To estimate the total country equity portfolio, we subtract
foreigners holdings from total domestic equity market capitalization and add the country total foreign portfolio.
Cross-country weighted averages are reported for each regional group, using GDP weights. Euro area (exc. EA
intra trade) and grand average (exc. EA intra trade) treat the euro area as one economic entity by excluding
intra-trade among euro area member states.
Equity Fixed Income
Country 1997 2001 ￿97￿01 1997 2001 ￿97￿01
Austria 0.67 0.34 0.33 0.69 0.18 0.51
Belgium 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.73 0.46 0.27
Finland 0.92 0.77 0.15 0.86 0.54 0.32
France 0.81 0.76 0.05 0.75 0.42 0.32
Germany 0.76 0.58 0.18 0.82 0.32 0.49
Ireland 0.55 0.34 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.20
Italy 0.76 0.61 0.16 1.00 0.65 0.35
Netherlands 0.72 0.51 0.20 0.70 0.57 0.13
Portugal 0.90 0.82 0.08 0.68 0.34 0.34
Spain 0.87 0.80 0.08 0.88 0.55 0.33
EMU countries 0.77 0.63 0.14 0.82 0.44 0.37
Denmark 0.72 0.57 0.15 0.90 0.83 0.07
Sweden 0.72 0.57 0.15 0.88 0.48 0.40
UK 0.74 0.69 0.05 0.46 0.33 0.13
Non-EMU EU 0.74 0.66 0.07 0.56 0.39 0.17
Australia 0.85 0.82 0.03 0.84 0.61 0.23
Bermuda 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00
Canada 0.72 0.68 0.04 0.92 0.92 0.00
Iceland 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.97 0.96 0.02
Israel 0.94 0.92 0.01 0.97 0.94 0.03
Japan 0.92 0.88 0.03 0.77 0.76 0.01
New Zealand 0.82 0.65 0.16 0.59 0.11 0.48
Norway 0.81 0.53 0.28 0.54 0.17 0.37
USA 0.76 0.74 0.02 0.91 0.92 -0.01
Singapore 0.82 0.68 0.13 0.62 0.24 0.38
Non EU dev. countries 0.81 0.78 0.03 0.86 0.86 0.00
Emerging Markets 0.94 0.93 0.01 0.80 0.95 -0.15
Grand Average 0.80 0.74 0.06 0.82 0.73 0.09
Euro area (exc. EA intra-trade) 0.85 0.75 0.10 0.88 0.68 0.20
Grand Average (exc. EA intra-trade) 0.82 0.77 0.05 0.84 0.79 0.05
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Share of EMU Assets in Foreign Portfolios
The table reports the share of EMU assets as a fraction of total foreign holdings by investing country
and region at the end of 1997 and 2001. All foreign holdings come from the IMF CPIS data base,
except for Germany, for which the 1997 data is from the Bundesbank. The values reported for
country groupings are regional aggregates and not regional averages.
Equity Fixed Income
Country 1997 2001 ￿01￿97 1997 2001 ￿01￿97
Austria 0.502 0.533 0.030 0.452 0.594 0.142
Belgium 0.839 0.789 -0.050 0.587 0.724 0.136
Finland 0.349 0.311 -0.039 0.285 0.747 0.462
France 0.390 0.511 0.120 0.445 0.567 0.122
Germany 0.626 0.596 -0.030 0.441 0.615 0.174
Ireland 0.138 0.254 0.116 0.424 0.415 -0.009
Italy 0.539 0.642 0.104 0.195 0.487 0.292
Netherlands 0.226 0.264 0.038 0.682 0.646 -0.035
Portugal 0.540 0.655 0.116 0.427 0.565 0.138
Spain 0.456 0.542 0.086 0.261 0.665 0.404
EMU countries 0.481 0.511 0.030 0.433 0.582 0.149
Denmark 0.320 0.262 -0.058 0.499 0.518 0.019
Sweden 0.408 0.315 -0.093 0.401 0.446 0.045
UK 0.353 0.413 0.060 0.387 0.389 0.001
Non-EMU EU 0.357 0.389 0.032 0.392 0.398 0.005
Australia 0.148 0.151 0.003 0.166 0.115 -0.051
Bermuda 0.148 0.109 -0.039 0.112 0.063 -0.049
Canada 0.134 0.139 0.005 0.070 0.109 0.039
Iceland 0.538 0.304 -0.234 0.137 0.254 0.117
Israel 0.027 0.064 0.037 0.147 0.160 0.013
Japan 0.166 0.168 0.001 0.268 0.309 0.041
New Zealand 0.100 0.066 -0.033 0.141 0.118 -0.023
Norway 0.244 0.265 0.021 0.348 0.413 0.065
USA 0.310 0.284 -0.026 0.210 0.267 0.057
Singapore 0.045 0.079 0.034 0.078 0.236 0.158
Non EU dev. countries 0.271 0.249 -0.022 0.233 0.280 0.047
Emerging Markets 0.040 0.197 0.157 0.020 0.085 0.066
Grand Average 0.334 0.357 0.022 0.325 0.434 0.109
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Share of EMU Portfolio Assets in Total Portfolios
The table reports the share of EMU assets as a fraction of total holdings by investing country and
region at the end of 1997 and 2001. All foreign holdings come from the IMF CPIS data base, except
for Germany, for which the 1997 data is from the Bundesbank. The values reported for country
groupings are regional aggregates and not regional averages.
Equity Fixed Income
Country 1997 2001 ￿01￿97 1997 2001 ￿01￿97
Austria 0.147 0.327 0.180 0.136 0.368 0.232
Belgium 0.296 0.344 0.049 0.154 0.353 0.199
Finland 0.021 0.058 0.037 0.099 0.572 0.472
France 0.066 0.100 0.034 0.102 0.278 0.175
Germany 0.134 0.183 0.049 0.068 0.264 0.197
Ireland 0.059 0.164 0.105 0.308 0.385 0.077
Italy 0.121 0.231 0.110 0.032 0.152 0.120
Netherlands 0.069 0.142 0.073 0.288 0.566 0.278
Portugal 0.077 0.121 0.044 0.131 0.327 0.196
Spain 0.042 0.075 0.033 0.030 0.267 0.237
EMU countries 0.108 0.166 0.058 0.092 0.285 0.193
Denmark 0.070 0.097 0.027 0.048 0.079 0.032
Sweden 0.082 0.121 0.039 0.047 0.181 0.134
UK 0.077 0.106 0.030 0.234 0.267 0.033
Non-EMU EU 0.077 0.107 0.031 0.176 0.228 0.052
Australia 0.018 0.026 0.008 0.023 0.028 0.004
Bermuda 0.144 0.101 -0.043 0.110 0.062 -0.048
Canada 0.026 0.035 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.002
Iceland 0.094 0.104 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.006
Israel 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.005
Japan 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.051 0.063 0.012
New Zealand 0.018 0.023 0.005 0.044 0.077 0.033
Norway 0.037 0.115 0.077 0.154 0.304 0.149
USA 0.031 0.031 0.001 0.012 0.012 -0.001
Singapore 0.007 0.021 0.014 0.023 0.171 0.148
Non EU dev. countries 0.028 0.030 0.002 0.024 0.029 0.005
Emerging Markets 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000
Grand Average 0.044 0.061 0.016 0.049 0.086 0.038
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Determinants of International Equity Portfolio Reallocation:
Active re-balancing (￿wA
ck;t)
This table reports the results of the pooled cross sectional regression of the change in the share of each foreign
holding for each investing country on dummy variables denoting whether the receiving country belongs to the
EMU (D1), whether both the receiving and investing countries belong to the EMU (D2), whether the receiving
country is the UK (D1UK) and whether the investing country belongs to EMU and the receiving country is the
UK (D2UK) and the following explanatory variables: DWck;97 = Di⁄erence between optimal and actual weights
in 1997. DBAGG
ck;t￿1 = Aggregate Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts. DBFX
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation
bene￿ts - fully hedged returns. DBEMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - internal EMU currency exposure.
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - external EMU currency exposure. Retk;t = Total market
return of receiving country, end-1997 to end-2001. Retk;t￿1 = Total market return of receiving country,
end-1993 to end-1997. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Explanatory Specif 2 Specif 3 Specif 4 Specif 5
Variables Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e.
Cst -0.004** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.004** (0.004) 0.004** (0.003)
D1 0.006** (0.003) 0.003* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
D2 0.016*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003)
D1UK -0.002 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016)
D2UK 0.032* (0.018) 0.034* (0.019) 0.033* (0.018) 0.033* (0.018)






ck;t￿1 16.64*** (3.831) 16.61*** (3.747) 16.59*** (3.876)
DBEMU
ck;t￿1 0.008*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003)
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 0.013 (0.032) 0.014 (0.032)
Retk;t 0.001 (0.001)
Retk;t￿1 0.000 (0.002)
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.433 0.432 0.431
F ￿ Stat 42.360 85.616 64.356 51.352
Sample size 667 667 667 667
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Determinants of International Bond Portfolio Reallocation:
Active re-balancing (￿wA
ck;t)
This table reports the results of the pooled cross sectional regression of the change in the share of each foreign
holding for each investing country on dummy variables denoting whether the receiving country belongs to the
EMU (D1), whether both the receiving and investing countries belong to the EMU (D2), whether the receiving
country is the UK (D1UK) and whether the investing country belongs to EMU and the receiving country is the
UK (D2UK) and the following explanatory variables: DWck;97 = Di⁄erence between optimal and actual weights
in 1997. DBAGG
ck;t￿1 = Aggregate Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts. DBFX
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation
bene￿ts - fully hedged returns. DBEMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - internal EMU currency exposure.
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - external EMU currency exposure. Retk;t = Total market
return of receiving country, end-1997 to end-2001. Retk;t￿1 = Total market return of receiving country,
end-1993 to end-1997. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Explanatory Specif 2 Specif 3 Specif 4 Specif 5
Variable Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e.
Cst -0.008*** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.003)
D1 0.012*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.004) 0.011** (0.004)
D2 0.027*** (0.005) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.005)
D1UK 0.026*** (0.010) 0.029*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.010) 0.021** (0.009)
D2UK -0.040*** (0.014) -0.041*** (0.015) -0.038*** (0.014) -0.038*** (0.014)






ck;t￿1 164.30** (69.62) 173.44** (71.41) 220.86*** (71.42)
DBEMU
ck;t￿1 -0.227 (0.227) -0.236 (0.236)
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 -0.144* (0.085) -0.147* (0.086)
Retk;t 0.003* (0.002)
Retk;t￿1 0.025*** (0.008)
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.219 0.228 0.233
F ￿ Stat 32.331 26.630 24.547 20.340
Sample size 639 639 639 639
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Determinants of International Portfolio Reallocation:
Active (￿wA
ck;t) / active and passive (￿wB
ck;t) re-balancing
This table reports the results of the pooled cross sectional regression of the change in the share of each foreign
holding for each investing country on dummy variables denoting whether the receiving country belongs to the
EMU (D1), whether both the receiving and investing countries belong to the EMU (D2), whether the receiving
country is the UK (D1UK) and whether the investing country belongs to EMU and the receiving country is
the UK (D2UK) and the following explanatory variables: DWck;97 = Di⁄erence between optimal and actual
weights in 1997. DBFX
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - fully hedged returns. DBEMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected
Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - internal EMU currency exposure. DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts -
external EMU currency exposure. Retk;t = Total market return of receiving country, end-1997 to end-2001.
Retk;t￿1 = Total market return of receiving country, end-1993 to end-1997. Y oungk;97 and Oldk;97 = Young
and old dependents to working-age population in country k relative to the world average in 1997. Tradeck;97 =
Country k￿ s export share in country c plus country c￿ s export share in country k in 1997. Corrupk;97 =
Corruption index in country k in 1997: 0 (highest risk) and 1 (lowest risk). White heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in parentheses.






variables Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e.
Cst 0.001 (0.003) 0.011 (0.003) -0.026*** (0.009) -0.030*** (0.010)
D1 0.003 (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.012** (0.005) 0.018*** (0.005)
D2 0.013*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.025*** (0.005)
D1UK -0.014 (0.016) -0.008 (0.016) 0.021* (0.010) 0.025** (0.010)
D2UK 0.034* (0.019) 0.032* (0.018) -0.041*** (0.014) -0.039*** (0.014)
DWck;97 0.207*** (0.049) 0.234*** (0.050) 0.314*** (0.108) 0.394*** (0.102)
DB
FX
ck;t￿1 2.751** (1.145) 17.35*** (3.736) 128.16 (82.32) 188.84** (88.67)
DBEMU
ck;t￿1 0.003 (0.003) 0.008*** (0.003) -0.247 (0.219) -0.219 (0.194)
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 0.006 (0.029) 0.012 (0.033) -0.156* (0.085) -0.139* (0.082)
Retk;t 0.005*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.009 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006)
Retk;t￿1 -0.000 (0.003) 0.003 (0.005) 0.027** (0.011) 0.029** (0.012)
Y oungk;97 0.035** (0.014) 0.031 (0.018) -0.006 (0.031) 0.007 (0.031)
Oldk;97 0.011 (0.032) -0.010 (0.034) -0.094* (0.051) -0.113** (0.051)
Tradeck;97 0.029** (0.014) 0.040** (0.020) 0.069*** (0.023) 0.045* (0.026)
Corrupk;97 0.001 (0.004) -0.008 (0.005) 0.020 (0.014) 0.026* (0.015)
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.444 0.163 0.241
F ￿ Stat: 15.946 38.968 9.886 15.491
Sample size 667 667 639 639
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Sensitivity Analysis A: Determinants of International Portfolio Reallocation of Larger Countries
Active (￿wA
ck;t) / active and passive (￿wB
ck;t) re-balancing
This table reports the results of the pooled cross sectional regression of the change in the share of each foreign
holding for each investing country with a GDP higher than USD 100 billion in 2001 on dummy variables
denoting whether the receiving country belongs to the EMU (D1), whether both the receiving and investing
countries belong to the EMU (D2), whether the receiving country is the UK (D1UK) and whether the investing
country belongs to EMU and the receiving country is the UK (D2UK) and the following explanatory variables:
DWck;97 = Di⁄erence between optimal and actual weights in 1997. DBFX
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation
bene￿ts - fully hedged returns. DBEMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - internal EMU currency exposure.
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - external EMU currency exposure. Retk;t = Total market
return of receiving country, end-1997 to end-2001. Retk;t￿1 = Total market return of receiving country, end-
1993 to end-1997. Y oungk;97 and Oldk;97 = Young and old dependents to working-age population in country
k relative to the world average in 1997. Tradeck;97 = Country k￿ s export share in country c plus country c￿ s
export share in country k in 1997. Corrupk;97 = Corruption index in country k in 1997: 0 (highest risk) and 1
(lowest risk). The countries excluded with a GDP below USD 100 billion in 2001 are: Bermuda, Chile, Iceland,
Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in
parentheses.






variables Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e.
Cst -0.001 (0.002) 0.006 (0.004) -0.015** (0.016) -0.017** (0.008)
D1 0.005 (0.003) 0.007** (0.003) 0.011* (0.006) 0.017*** (0.006)
D2 0.012*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.029) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.023*** (0.005)
D1UK 0.011 (0.012) 0.015 (0.011) 0.025** (0.012) 0.028** (0.012)
D2UK 0.009 (0.016) 0.008 (0.015) -0.043*** (0.015) -0.042*** (0.015)
DWck;97 0.174*** (0.063) 0.179*** (0.062) 0.288*** (0.103) 0.348*** (0.093)
DB
FX
ck;t￿1 2.798** (1.360) 16.095*** (6.023) 144.92 (77.57) 214.00*** (81.24)
DBEMU
ck;t￿1 0.160 (0.234) 0.160 (0.213) -0.188 (0.149) -0.149 (0.152)
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 0.069 (0.152) 0.075 (0.175) -0.159* (0.092) -0.145* (0.086)
Retk;t 0.005*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.004 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006)
Retk;t￿1 -0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.027** (0.013) 0.028** (0.013)
Y oungk;97 0.030** (0.012) 0.022 (0.014) -0.009 (0.033) 0.001 (0.034)
Oldk;97 0.012 (0.029) -0.011 (0.029) -0.093* (0.054) -0.108** (0.051)
Tradeck;97 0.032** (0.014) 0.043** (0.021) 0.055** (0.022) 0.032 (0.026)
Corrupk;97 0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013)
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.282 0.157 0.221
F ￿ Stat: 10.091 15.587 8.254 12.080
Sample size 552 522 547 547
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Sensitivity Analysis B: Determinants of International Portfolio Reallocation with Supply E⁄ects
Active (￿wA
ck;t) / active and passive (￿wB
ck;t) re-balancing
This table reports the results of the pooled cross sectional regression of the change in the share of each foreign
holding for each investing country controlling for net new international equity and bond issuance over the period
1998-2001. D1 = 1 if the receiving country belongs to the EMU. D2 = 1 if both the receiving and investing
countries belong to the EMU. D1UK = 1 if the receiving country is the UK. D2UK = 1 if the investing country
belongs to EMU and the receiving country is the UK. DWck;97 = Di⁄erence between optimal and actual
weights in 1997. DBFX
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - fully hedged returns. DBEMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected
Diversi￿cation bene￿ts - internal EMU currency exposure. DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 = Expected Diversi￿cation bene￿ts -
external EMU currency exposure. Retk;t = Total market return of receiving country, end-1997 to end-2001.
Retk;t￿1 = Total market return of receiving country, end-1993 to end-1997. Y oungk;97 and Oldk;97 = Young
and old dependents to working-age population in country k relative to the world average in 1997. Tradeck;97 =
Country k￿ s export share in country c plus country c￿ s export share in country k in 1997. Corrupk;97 =
Corruption index in country k in 1997: 0 (highest risk) and 1 (lowest risk). Net Issuesk;t = Net international
issuance of each individual country divided by the total country portfolio. White heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in parentheses.






variables Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e. Coe⁄. s.e.
Cst 0.006 (0.003) 0.014 (0.006) -0.028*** (0.009) -0.031*** (0.010)
D1 0.002 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 0.011** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.005)
D2 0.013*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.025*** (0.005)
D1UK -0.013 (0.016) -0.007 (0.016) 0.019* (0.011) 0.023** (0.011)
D2UK 0.034* (0.019) 0.031 (0.018) -0.041*** (0.014) -0.039*** (0.013)
DWck;97 0.211*** (0.050) 0.242*** (0.051) 0.316*** (0.109) 0.397*** (0.102)
DB
FX
ck;t￿1 3.323* (1.700) 21.97*** (6.512) 137.94 (83.80) 199.48** (88.70)
DBEMU
ck;t￿1 0.002 (0.003) 0.008** (0.003) -0.240 (0.218) -0.212 (0.217)
DB
X￿EMU
ck;t￿1 0.007 (0.037) 0.014 (0.038) -0.152* (0.084) -0.135* (0.081)
Retk;t 0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.012* (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
Retk;t￿1 0.001 (0.005) 0.005* (0.003) 0.025** (0.012) 0.027** (0.012)
Y oungk;97 0.037** (0.014) 0.040* (0.020) -0.002 (0.030) 0.012 (0.029)
Oldk;97 0.010 (0.032) -0.024 (0.035) -0.078 (0.053) -0.096* (0.056)
Tradeck;97 0.029** (0.014) 0.039** (0.019) 0.070*** (0.022) 0.046* (0.026)
Corrupk;97 0.000 (0.004) -0.012** (0.005) 0.019 (0.014) 0.026* (0.015)
Net Issuesk;t 0.023*** (0.007) 0.049*** (0.013) 0.009 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.427 0.163 0.242
F ￿ Stat: 14.974 34.096 9.300 14.546
Sample size 667 667 639 639
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Aggregate non-Domestic Portfolio Holdings by Region
The ￿gures report the aggregate foreign holdings for country groupings. Foreign asset holdings are
from the IMF CPIS surveys of 1997 and 2001, except for Germany, for which the 1997 data is
from the Bundesbank. The 10 EMU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. The three non-EMU EU countries are: Denmark,
Sweden, the United Kingdom. The 10 non-EU developed countries include: Australia, Bermuda,
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, Singapore. The seven
emerging markets are Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Venezuela.
a. Aggregate non-domestic equity holdings (US$ Billion)
b. Aggregate non-domestic ￿xed income holdings (US$ Billion)
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The Decline in Home Bias in Equity and Bond Portfolios by Region
The ￿gures report measured home bias in 1997 and 2001 of equity and ￿xed income for coun-
try groupings. Cross-country weighted averages are reported for each regional group, using GDP
weights. Foreign asset holdings are from the IMF CPIS surveys of 1997 and 2001, except for Ger-
many, for which the 1997 data is from the Bundesbank. The 10 EMU countries are: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. The three non-EMU
EU countries are: Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom. The 10 non-EU developed countries
include: Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United
States, Singapore. The 7 emerging markets are: Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Thailand, Venezuela. Euro area (exc. EA intra trade) and grand average (exc. EA intra trade)
treat the euro area as one economic entity by excluding intra-trade among euro area member states.
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Non-Domestic EMU Portfolios by Region
Figures in (a) report the EMU equity assets held by residents of region i relative to foreign equity
assets held in region i. Figures in (b) report the EMU bond assets held by residents of region
i relative to foreign bond assets held in region i. Foreign asset holdings are from the IMF CPIS
surveys of 1997 and 2001, except for Germany, for which the 1997 data is from the Bundesbank. The
10 EMU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain. The 3 non-EMU EU countries are: Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom. The
10 non-EU developed countries include: Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, the United States, Singapore. The 7 emerging markets are: Argentina, Chile,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Venezuela.
a. Share of non-domestic EMU equity holdings in foreign equity portfolio (%)
b. Share of non-domestic EMU bond holdings in foreign bond portfolio (%)
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Changes in the Share of non-Domestic EMU Assets by Region
Figures in (a) correspond to the 1997 to 2001 changes in EMU assets held by residents of region
i relative to foreign assets held in region i. Figures in (b) correspond to the 1997 to 2001 changes
in EMU assets held by residents of region i relative to total assets held in region i. Foreign asset
holdings are from the IMF CPIS surveys of 1997 and 2001, except for Germany, for which the
1997 data is from the Bundesbank. The 10 EMU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. The 3 non-EMU EU countries are: Denmark,
Sweden, the United Kingdom. The 10 non-EU developed countries include: Australia, Bermuda,
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, Singapore. The 7 emerging
markets are: Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Venezuela.
a. Share of non-domestic EMU holdings in foreign portfolio (percentage points)
b. Share of non-domestic EMU holdings in total portfolio (percentage points)
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